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Behavioral Ecology Advance Access originally published online on May 28, 2007
Behavioral Ecology 2007 18(4):736-741; doi:10.1093/beheco/arm040
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© The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Society for Behavioral Ecology. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

Vulnerability and reliable signaling in conflicts between hermit crabs

Mark E. Laidre

Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544, USA and Department of Zoology, University of Cambridge, Downing Street, Cambridge CB2 3EJ, UK

Address correspondence to M.E. Laidre. E-mail: MEL23{at}cornell.edu.


   Abstract

When interacting organisms have opposing genetic interests, the integrity of communication systems may be undermined. For signaling in such conflict circumstances to remain evolutionarily stable, cheaters must be handicapped. Agonistic threat signals, however, are not always constrained or costly to produce, and yet these signals occur in the severest of conflicts where strong incentives exist for dishonesty. A leading hypothesis for how reliability is stabilized under these conditions is that signaling entails a risk, making signalers vulnerable to injury. Here I experimentally alter vulnerability to show how risk can modify organisms' willingness to escalate disputes, affecting the use of threat signals. The vulnerability to injury of hermit crabs (Pagurus bernhardus) was manipulated by varying the exposure of their soft uncalcified abdomens. When faced with potentially damaging conspecific attacks, more vulnerable crabs were conflict averse, showing reluctance to claim ownership over contestable food, frequently retreating from threats, and refraining from threatening others. The risk an organism can bear in escalated conflict can thus mediate its agonistic behavior and usage of threats. Postural nuances can consequently provide reliable information about aggressive intentions despite minimal production costs and opposing interests between communication parties.

Key words: conflict, honest signaling, reliable communication, threat display, vulnerability handicap, evolutionary stability.

Received 2 November 2006; revised 4 March 2007; accepted 1 April 2007.


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M. E. Laidre
How rugged individualists enable one another to find food and shelter: field experiments with tropical hermit crabs
Proc R Soc B, December 23, 2009; (2009) rspb.2009.1580v1.
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